2016年诺贝尔经济学奖授予了哈佛大学Hart教授和MIT的Holmstrom教授，以表彰他们在Contract Theory（亦称Incentive Theory，包含Information Economics、Mechanism Design等广泛内容）方面的贡献。这是诺贝尔经济学奖对微观经济理论研究，特别是信息经济学与激励机制设计领域研究的肯定。借此东风，经济学院有幸邀请到两位激励机制设计领域的杰出青年学者于10月19到21日来我院进行讲学和报告，他们分别是澳大利亚悉尼科技大学的张军教授和荷兰阿姆斯特丹大学的Audrey Hu（胡贤华）教授，讲座相关信息如下：

1. 短期课程名称：Auction Theory（拍卖理论）

主讲人：张军 教授

讲座时间：10月19、20、21日下午2:00-5:00

讲座地点：经济学院第一会议室

Syllabus for Auction Theory

    In this course the students will have the opportunity to enrich and sharpen their knowledge of Auction Theory.

Textbooks: Auction Theory (Second Edition) by Vijay Krishna (ISBN: 978-0-12-374507-1).

Depending on the time and progress, the course will cover the following major topics:

	Content
1	Introduction and Private Value Auctions
2	The Revenue Equivalence Principle
3	Risk preferences and Asymmetries
4	Auctions with Interdependent Values
5	Revenue Ranking with Affiliation
6	Asymmetric English Auctions
7	Selling Multiple Units
8	Multiunit Auctions: Equilibrium and Efficiency
9	Revenue in Multiunit Auctions

 

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张军教授简历

    张军2010年在加拿大Queen’s University获得经济学博士学位，现任澳大利亚University of Technology Sydney副教授，江西南昌人。主要研究领域：Mechanism Design, Regulation, Auctions, Innovation, Bayesian Persuasion, Contests, Market Segmentation Strategy, Production Technology Estimation, Disruptive Technology, Consumer Fairness Concerns, Context Effect。张军教授已先后在Economic Journal、Journal of Economic Theory、International Journal of Industrial Organization等国际顶级经济学期刊发表学术论文多篇。

2. 讲座主题：A Note on Low Reserve in Auctions

主讲人：Audrey Hu（胡贤华） 教授

讲座时间：10月19日上午9:00

讲座地点：经济学院第一会议室

Abstract

    It has been a "puzzle" that empirically observed reserve prices in auctions often seem to be lower than received auction theory would predict. In this paper, we address this low reserve puzzle by extending the theory to include both interdependent values and risk averse bidders. In a standard second-price auctions setting, we find that if the bidders are sufficiently risk averse, or if their values are sufficiently interdependent, a profit-maximizing reserve price should be lower than the seller's value for the good. This result is due to the fact that in a second-price auction, value interdependence causes the lowest bid a bidder will ever make to be strictly larger than the reserve price, and this "gap" increases with bidder risk aversion. If the gap is large enough, lowering the reserve price will, paradoxically, increase each bidder's ex ante expected payment to the seller, because it increases the likelihood he will pay the higher second-highest bid rather than the lower reserve price.

3. 讲座主题：Sequential Auctions with General Interdependent Values

主讲人：Audrey Hu（胡贤华） 教授

讲座时间：10月20日上午9:00

讲座地点：经济学院第一会议室

Abstract

      Bidders at sequential auctions are typically businesspersons or firms that are also competitors in the same product (service markets), where negative information externalities (NIE) may be common such that increasing a bidder's type decreases his competing bidders' expected values. We provide an analysis of sequential auctions for multiple identical objects with general interdependent values and show that for risk neutral bidders with unit demand and independent types, an NIE environment entails downward price trends that are robust to all sequencing and payment rules. The well-known "declining price anomaly" could, therefore, be evidence of NIE even though revenue equivalence holds ex-ante.

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Audrey Hu（胡贤华）教授简历

       Audrey Hu（胡贤华）于2010年在阿姆斯特丹大学获得经济学博士学位，现任阿姆斯特丹大学副教授，浙江绍兴人。主要研究领域：Auctions、Incentive Theory、Mechanism Design、Corporate Finance。胡教授已先后在Economic Journal、Journal of Economic Theory、Games and Economic Behavior、International Journal of Industrial Organization等国际顶级经济学期刊发表学术论文多篇。

作者：胡莎莎                作者单位：经济学院

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